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The calculation of volatility poses problems in party systems where there is high discontinuity in 
electons
1
 (ie. parties and any other “electoral units”, most importantly coalitions), either because 
of breakthroughs of new ones or innovation amongst old ones (i.e. splits and mergers). While 
some genuinely new electons can be identified easily, challenges are posed by (a) those that 
appear new but are in fact old ones gone through a makeover, (b) those that are reasonably novel 
in terms of organisation or personnel, yet have clear links to old ones, possibly even retaining a 
name, and (c) those that split/merge in equal or unequal parts, ie when the main successor or 
predecessor is unidentifiable. Dichotomous classification of such partially novel
2
 electons as 
new or old can both be misleading and have a disproportionate effect on volatility scores.  
 
This paper proposes new measures of congruence and novelty based on four dimensions partly 
inspired by Barnea & Rahat’s (2010) work: (a) name and organization, (b) leader, (c) candidates, 
and (d) patterns of support. While useful indicators on their own, the main objective of the paper 
is to show how the measures can be used for weighting vote differentials when calculating 
volatility scores.  
 
Barnea & Rahat (2010) emphasize the importance of the concept of party newness to analysis of 
party system change and open up a new avenue for volatility research by proposing a threshold 
to determine dichotomously whether a party should be considered new, based on a framework of 
eight criteria, inspired by V.O. Key’s (1942) notion of parties as ‘tripartite systems of 
interaction’: 
 
(a) Party-in-the-electorate. Criteria: label, ideology, voters. 
(b) Party-as-organization. Criteria: formal/legal status, institutions, activists 
(c) Party-in-government. Criteria: representatives, policies. 
 
While party newness has generally been used as a dichotomous variable (Hug 2001, Sikk 2005, 
etc), it is difficult to see why it could/would/should not be used as a scalar variable in party 
                                                          
1 While the term might be awkward at first sight, it is necessary to emphasize the conceptual distinction between “electoral units” 
and political parties. Electoral coalitions are a commonplace in many (new) democracies; sometimes non-party organizations 
contest elections and even more often some “parties” (defined as electoral units) do not have a proper “party” behind the; some 
party lists incorporate independent candidates or members of other parties; Individual candidates and parties that contest sub- or 
supra-national elections only (e.g. Danish Eurosceptics) also deviate from the norm party is an electoral unit is a party. In 
practical terms, “electon” is easier to use in text when one needs to refer specifically both to “parties and electoral coalitions”. 
2 The term “discontinuity” may be more appropriate for electons that show great discontinuity, yet are not really “novel” – e.g.  
rump parties after big declines in popularity – see the example of the Latvian LPP/LC below. 
 system studies. Here, Barnea & Rahat’s framework is generally adopted, but some of their 
criteria are combined and the candidates is added: 
(a) Name/organization. A genuinely old electon must retain its name and a genuinely new 
one should contest elections under a novel name. As we are interested in electons (parties 
and coalitions), the focus is on electoral names and electoral (rather than internal) 
organization, understood primarily in terms of coalitions. Another reason for combining 
name and electoral organization is that sometimes an electon with an unchanged name 
actually has a somewhat changed identity – e.g. when parties that formed a coalition 
merge before the subsequent election under the same name.
3
  
(b) Leader. Obviously an electon under an unchanged leader cannot be considered new; 
alternatively, there is always an element of newness to a party whenever there is a 
genuinely new leader, i.e. someone who replaced the old one in a competitive election, or 
was chosen when an old one was pushed out (e.g. after an electoral defeat).  On the other 
hand, there would be less newness to a leader if he or she has for some time been near the 
top of party leadership. Additionally, electons lead by former key players in country’s 
politics – heads of government and executive presidents – do not count as genuinely new 
even if they did not lead or even belong to a party previously (following Sikk 2005).
4
 
(c) Candidates. If all or most top candidates of an electon contested previous elections on 
the same list, the electons can be considered (at least partially) congruent. If the 
candidates come from two or more previous electons, the congruence to each of them can 
be established by the share of candidates previously in each respective list. 
(d) Pattern of support. Even if an electon is fairly old according to the above three criteria, it 
can still be somewhat discontinuous/novel if its spatial or social pattern of support has 
changed. It can either be because of considerable changes to its programmatic profile, 
focussing on new issues or some of its most senior candidates contesting in different 
districts. Obviously, this criterion can only be applied for electons that are clearly linked 
to earlier electons according to the first three criteria. 
 
Note that (governing) coalition patterns and the overlap in MPs or ministers, that are sometimes 
considered relevant for assessing party novelty are excluded as they are impossible to apply for 
opposition parties and parliamentary drop-outs. A further technical issue regards MPs and 
ministers, especially small parties or small parliaments – the carry-over index can depend 
significantly on whether single MPs lose/retain their seats. 
 
Table 1 gives an overview of how these criteria of electon congruence are operationalized. An 
electon is compared to its precursors,
5
 where 1 indicates a perfect congruence and 0 prefect 
incongruence.
6
 The scores are tabulated in congruence matrices, where the sum of scores for 
each electon in the most recent election indicates an overall overlap. The difference between one 
and the sum of overlaps is the index of novelty on the dimension. The averages of the four 
                                                          
3 Two such mergers in the Latvian example below! 
4 Electoral coalitions may or may not have formal leadership, often the leaders of its constituent parties act as co-leaders and 
changes amongst them contribute to discontinuity. 
5 All preceding electons for leader and candidates. 
6 Congruence for unrelated electons is 0. 
 matrix cells indicate congruence between two electons and the average of the four incongruence 
scores is the electon’s index of novelty. An example based on 2011 elections in Latvia will 
illustrate the procedure. 
 
Table 1: Electon congruence 
Dimension Comments on scaling 
Related Barnea & Rahat 
criteria 
Name/organization 1: old name/old electoral organization, 0.75: cosmetic 
changes, 0.5: substantial changes (a very different name, 
coalitional changes), 0: completely new (i.e. unrelated to 
identifiable precursors). 
Party label/formal/legal 
status 
Leader 0.5: the old leader stepped down for obvious non-political 
reasons 
0.5: the new leader has been the party leader previously, was 
previously a deputy leader, or a major cabinet minister 
(Representatives) 
Candidates Share of new candidates in top 25% in the most relevant tier 
(or of all candidates in SMD’s) 
Representatives 
Pattern of support Is the spatial pattern in support congruent or substantially 
changed? Index of spatial congruence in vote shares (for 
details, see Appendix).
7
 
Voters 
Programme* Qualitative evidence, potentially manifesto / expert survey 
data 
Policies/ideology 
Party institutions* Evidence of either funding, membership, structural or 
leadership/candidate selection changes 
Institutions/activists? 
* To be implemented 
 
 
Illustration: Latvia 2011 
 
For illustrative purposes, the congruence and novelty scores for 2011 
parliamentary elections in Latvia are shown below; the list of electons and results 
is presented in Table 2.
8
 Note that the parliament elected in 2010 was exclusively 
based on electoral coalitions, two of which merged into proper political parties 
before 2011 elections. ZRP, a party set up by former president Valdis Zatlers was 
the only real newcomer, but as we will see below, there was a degree of newness 
to some of the other electons. 
  
                                                          
7 Either based on electoral districts or administrative units. 
8 Pre-term elections were held in 2011 after the parliament was dissolved in a referendum initiated by president Valdis Zatlers 
(later the leader of ZRP) following his unsuccessful bid for re-election. 
  
Table 2. Latvian parliamentary election results (2010-2011) 
 
 2010 
V% (S%) 
2011 
V% (S%) 
SC Harmony Centre, Politisko partiju apvienība “Saskaņas Centrs” 26.0 (29) 28.4 (31) 
ZRP Zatlers’s Reform Party, Zatlera Reformu partija – 20.1 (22) 
Unity Vienotība 31.2 (33) 18.8 (20) 
NA 
National Alliance, Nacionālā apvienība “Visu Latvijai!”-”Tēvzemei un 
Brīvībai/LNNK” 
7.7 (8) 13.9 (14) 
ZZS Green and Farmer’s Union, Zaļo un Zemnieku savienība 19.7 (22) 12.2 (13) 
LPP/LC Šlesers’s Reform Party LPP/LC, Šlesera Reformu partiju LPP/LC – 2.4 (0) 
PLL “For a Good Latvia”, Partiju apvienība “Par Labu Latviju” 7.7 (8) – 
PCTVL “For Human Rights in United Latvia”,”Par cilvēka tiesībām vienotā Latvijā” 1.4 (0) 0.8 (0) 
Note: vote shares of coalitions in italics. 
 
Tables 3-6 below show congruence matrices for the four dimensions and Table 7 gives the 
aggregate congruence and novelty scores. Unity and NA that had transformed into proper parties 
between 2010 and 2011 and are hence marginally novel; PLL in 2010 was a coalition of two 
parties – the People’s Party (TP) and LPP/LC, of which only the latter ran in 2011 (see Table 3).  
None of the old electons changed leaders, but there were minor changes related to the 
transformations of three coalitions (Unity, NA, LPP/LC, see Table 4).  
 
Four electons (SC, Unity, ZZS and PCTVL) showed remarkable continuity in terms of their top 
five candidates in the five electoral districts (see Table 5). As expected, ZRP appeared almost 
perfectly novel. Interestingly, only about half of the top candidates for NA in 2011 had been 
candidates in 2010 – perhaps related to the fact that at the time of the merger, VL, previously the 
junior partner, had overtaken TB/LNNK in importance. Also fairly novel was the candidate line-
up of LPP/LC – one could speculate that the party tried to freshen up its candidate list following 
the decision of TP not to contest the election (and later liquidate altogether) that led to a loss of a 
number of prominent candidates.
9
 The congruence indexes for the spatial pattern of support are 
shown in Table 6 with the distribution of doubling coefficients for individual electons are shown 
on Figure 1. Congruence was fairly high for most electons, with the partial exception of LPP/LC, 
for which the loss of a coalition partner led to bigger losses in some parts of the country than 
others (the same applied for the extra-parliamentary PCTVL).   
 
Table 3. Congruence matrix and novelty index: Name/organization 
 
  
 
2011 
 
  
2010                          SC ZRP Unity NA ZZS LPP/LC PCTVL 
SC 1  
   
  
Unity   .75
a
 
  
  
NA   
 
.75
 a
 
 
  
ZZS   
  
1   
PLL   
   
.75
b
  
PCTVL   
   
 1 
Novelty  1 .25 .25 0 .25 0 
a
 Formally a coalition in 2010. 
b
 LPP/LC part of PLL coalition in 2010. 
 
  
                                                          
9 However, the inclusion of “Šlesers’s Reform Party” in  its name was no more than a (hostile) pun on the name of the party of 
the former president – who promised to fight the power of oligarchs (incl Šlesers) in Latvian politics. 
 Table 4. Congruence matrix and novelty index: Leader 
 
  
 
2011  
  2010                          SC ZRP Unity NA ZZS LPP/LC PCTVL 
SC 1       
Unity   .75
a
     
NA    0.5
d
    
ZZS     1   
PLL      .75
b
  
PCTVL       1
c 
Novelty 0 1 .25 .5 0 .25 0 
a
 Solvita Āboltiņa, was a co-chair of the coalition in 2010 and the leader of its largest party (New Era). 
b
 Ainārs Šlesers, the leader of LPP/LC in 2011 was a co-chair of PLL coalition in 2010. 
c
 Three chairpersons. 
d
 One of two the party leaders in 2011 was a co-chair of the coalition in 2010. 
 
Table 5. Congruence matrix and novelty index: Candidates 
 
  
 
2011  
  2010                          SC ZRP Unity NA ZZS LPP/LC PCTVL 
SC .96       
Unity  .08 .84 .04    
NA    .52 .04   
ZZS     .88   
PLL     .04 .56  
PCTVL      .04 .80 
Novelty .04 .92 .16 .44 .04 .40 .20 
Note: 115 candidates in five districts (23 per district), top 25% ≈ 5 
 
Table 6. Congruence matrix and novelty index: Pattern of support 
   
 
2011  
  2010                          SC ZRP Unity NA ZZS LPP/LC PCTVL
SC .93       
Unity   .94     
NA    .91    
ZZS     .81   
PLL      .77  
PCTVL       .76 
Novelty .06 1.00 .06 .09 .15 .24 .24 
Note: For the calculation of the index, see Appendix.  
 
Figure 1. Distribution of vote doubling coefficients across districts. 
 
 Overall (see Table 7), ZRP appears virtually perfectly new, reflecting the aim of the former 
president to run as candidates people with no previous party political experience. Most other 
electons appear more old than new, yet the scores for NA and LPP/LC reflect a certain degree of 
novelty, that is reasonable given the developments within these electons between the elections. 
 
Table 7: Overall congruence and novelty 
 
  
 
2011  
  2010                          SC ZRP Unity NA ZZS LPP/LC PCTVL
SC 0.97       
Unity  0.02 0.82 0.01    
NA    0.67 0.01   
ZZS     0.92   
PLL     0.01 0.71  
PCTVL      0.01 0.89 
Novelty 0.03 0.98 0.18 0.32 0.06 0.29 0.11 
 
Using congruence scores for calculating volatility 
 
For the calculation of volatility scores, the approach outlined above is obviously useful for 
detecting electons that are genuinely new in a political system, using a certain threshold. 
However, I would argue that the actual congruence and novelty scores can be used in 
calculations to obtain even better (more “realistic”) volatility indices in the following way. 
 
For electons that are only partially novel, their links to older electons can be taken into account. 
In the above example, 2 per cent of ZRP’s vote share can be assigned as support for a 
“successor” of Unity (obviously, congruence of 2 per cent is too marginal to be practicable to be 
taken into account). Similarly we can presume that 29 per cent of LPP/LC vote share was for a 
novel electon. 
 
For splits and mergers, the vote share can be assigned to successors and predecessors in 
proportion to congruence scores. Unfortunately, there were no cases of that in Latvia 2011, with 
the exception of PLL, where one of the partners simply disappeared. The following hypothetical 
example explains the method: 
 
 Electon A (50% votes) splits into A1 (30%) and A2 (20%) 
 The novelty scores are .50 for A1 and .10 for A2. Hence, 15% of (total) votes are for 
A1 as a novel electon (A1
N
) and 15% as a continuation of A (A1*).  
 2% of votes are for A2 as a novel electon (A2N) and 18% as a continuation of A 
(A2*). 
 The congruence scores (against A) are .50 for A1 and .90 for A2 
 Hence, the vote share in (t-1) of electon A is split proportionally between the 
“virtual” predecessors of A1* (.5/1.4=.357  17.9% of the total vote) and A2* 
(.9/1.4=.643  32.2% of the total vote). 
 For simplicity, let us assume that the only competitor was electon B that was 
perfectly congruous between the two elections (novelty = 0).  
 The raw vote shares in the two elections 
  
 
A 50% – change: –50% 
B 50% 50% change: 0% 
A1 – 30% change: +30% 
A2 – 20% change: +20% 
   Volatility: 50% 
 
  is transformed into “virtual” vote shares: 
 
A1* 17.9% 15% change: –2.9% 
A1
N – 15% change: +15% 
A2* 32.2% 18% change: –14.2% 
A2
N
 – 2% change: +2% 
B 50% 50% change: 0% 
   Volatility: 17.1% 
 
Notice the relevance to the volatility score of half-novelty (A1) and strong congruence with the 
predecessor (A2).  
 
The assumption of no continuation between A and A1/A2 in the first table is clearly 
unreasonable and inflates the volatility score. There are three other (and simpler) ways of 
dealing with the issue of continuity: 
 
Identifying a successor electon (A2 because of clearly higher congruence): 
A1 – 30% change:+30% 
A  50% 20% change: -30% 
B
 
50% 50% change: 0% 
   Volatility: 30% 
 
Combining the support for A1 and A2 (method used in many previous studies including 
Bartolini & Mair 1990, Sikk 2005): 
A1+A2 50% 50% change: 0% 
B
 
50% 50% change: 0% 
   Volatility: 0% 
 
Splitting the vote in (t-1) according to support in (t): 
A1* 30% 30% change: 0% 
A2* 20% 20% change: 0% 
B
 
50% 50% change: 0% 
   Volatility: 0% 
 
The last two quite clearly underestimate the level of electoral change. Identifying a successor 
could still be argued to overestimate volatility – note that A1 was half-congruent with A, 
meaning it either shared a name, a leader or  a good number of top candidates – that extent of 
continuation should not be overlooked. Please note that due to large differences in novelty 
 scores, identifying a successor is relatively straightforward here. If, say, two equally strong 
parties terminated their loose and ad hoc coalition, deciding on a single successor would be 
much more difficult and would lead to a more obviously overestimated volatility score. 
 
Taking into account the four dimensions of newness is obviously more complex and time-
consuming than the classical approach to volatility, but as shown above, it reduces the risk of 
seriously under- or overestimating party system change that will always result if the volatility 
scores are based on dichotomous decisions on party newness – including identifying a single 
successor or predecessor in case of splits mergers. As shown above, an easier approach of 
combining support in the election when the electons ran separately can seriously underestimate 
levels of party system change. 
 
The outlined approach is computationally slightly more intensive than the standard approach, but 
the data for calculating congruity matrices is relatively easy to obtain. Historical data on party 
names, coalitions and leaders
10
 is relatively easy to collect. Data on candidates for historically 
more distant elections might be somewhat difficult to obtain, but the data should be reasonably 
easily available for the last few decades, frequently in electronic form that makes the matching 
of candidate lists easier.  
 
More generally, this paper calls into the question whether a party is a proper unit of analysis for 
calculating volatility or even analysing party system dynamics.
11
 Not only is a party only one 
possible type of an electon – sometimes completely absent in parliamentary elections (e.g. 
Latvia 2010). Many changes in party systems are complex, involving several parties and various 
degrees of novelty, often in conjunction. The traditional toolkit did not make it possible to 
account for complex realities, but as is shown in this paper, a much fuller picture can be 
incorporated with some innovation and fairly limited extra effort. 
 
Appendix: Index for spatial congruence of vote shares 
 
The formula for the index for spatial congruence of vote shares is: 
 
  
∑|     ̅̅ ̅̅ |
 
 
 
Where n is the number of districts (or administrative subdivisions) analysed and DC is the 
doubling coefficient: 
 
       (
  
    
) 
 
                                                          
10 Somewhat surprisingly, this was the most difficult part of calculating the Latvian example – mostly because of the prevalence 
of electoral coalitions with sometimes ill-defined leadership. 
11 I would speculate that volatility scores based based on congruence and novelty indices also provide a better approximation of 
voter-level volatility, that has long been one of the aims of analysis of volatility (Pedersen, Bartolini & Mair). 
 The index is based on ratios of vote shares in two elections (vt/vt-1) as the more conventional 
difference in vote shares is dependent on overall support levels – e.g. for a party with 5 per cent 
increase in support of 10 percentage points would be a major change (and it cannot possibly lose 
that much support) while it would be a much smaller change for a major party. In order to bring 
the increases and decreases to the same scale, the ratios are logged on the base of 2 – resulting in 
the doubling coefficient that equals 1 if the vote share is doubled (i.e. increased by the factor of 
2) and –1 when it is halved (i.e. decreased by the factor of 2). The index of spatial congruence is 
based on the average absolute deviation of doubling coefficients from the mean. It is equal to 
one when all districts saw a like change in support – indicating perfect congruence (i.e. no 
change) in electon’s support patterns. It is equal to zero when fluctuations were of very different 
magnitudes in different districts – typically, when the support doubled in half of the districts and 
halved in half of the districts. In real life situations, it is difficult to imagine the score going 
below zero, but for consistency reasons, it is capped at zero.
12
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12 In principle, it is possible to transform the indicator so that it approaches but never quite reaches zero, but the more elegant 
interpretation resulting from the doubling coefficients outweighs the inelegance of capping the measure at zero. 
